phenomenon · first seen 16 Oct 2026
principal-agent problem
Contract design problem where a principal incentivizes an agent whose objectives or beliefs may differ from the principal's.
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PapersCodeDiscussion
Earliest sources
- Contracting with an Agent under Model MismatchPapers · 16 Oct 2026 · Elif Yılmaz, Jakub Tłuczek, Victor Villin, Christos Dimitrakakis
- Incentive-Responsive Agents: A Principal-Agent Framework, Metric Suite, and Runtime Architecture for Long-Lived Personal AI AgentsPapers · 11 Nov 2026 · Jipu Su
Latest sources
- Incentive-Responsive Agents: A Principal-Agent Framework, Metric Suite, and Runtime Architecture for Long-Lived Personal AI AgentsPapers · 11 Nov 2026 · Jipu Su
- Contracting with an Agent under Model MismatchPapers · 16 Oct 2026 · Elif Yılmaz, Jakub Tłuczek, Victor Villin, Christos Dimitrakakis